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CAUTION AHEAD, INSIDER LENDERS: 
NINTH CIRCUIT FINDS AUTHORITY TO 
RECHARACTERIZE THROUGH APPLICABLE 
STATE LAW IN IN RE FITNESS HOLDINGS 
Blair Tarnutzer 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In April 2013, the Ninth Circuit joined five other circuit courts 
in holding that a court had the power to recharacterize debt as equity 
in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, of the Estate of 
Fitness Holdings International, Inc. v. Hancock Park Capital II, L.P. 
(In re Fitness Holdings International, Inc.).1 In doing so, however, 
the Ninth and Fifth Circuits recharacterized debt by applying state 
law while the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits created and 
applied their own respective tests based on federal law.2 
The Ninth Circuit’s minority approach is sounder than the 
majority circuits’ approach because its test is rooted in bankruptcy 
law precedent.3 Bankruptcy law is layered over one’s existing rights, 
which are defined by both state and federal law.4 When examining 
whether the court had power to recharacterize debt, the Ninth Circuit 
defined “reasonably equivalent value” through terms within the 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. in Communication, 
University of Southern California, May 2011. I would like to thank Professor Mary Kors for her 
continual guidance, support and patience. I am also truly grateful for the editors and staffers of 
the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their support, encouragement and camaraderie. 
Lastly, I would like to thank both my family and Murphy Troy for teaching me the values of hard 
work, and encouraging me to take on any challenge. Thank you for believing in me and inspiring 
me to do the same. 
 1. 714 F.3d 1141, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 2. See James M. Wilton & Stephen Moeller-Sally, Debt Recharacterization Under State 
Law, 62 BUS. LAW 1257, 1261 (2007). 
 3. See generally In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1144–48 (using case law and bankruptcy statutes 
to justify recharacterization). 
 4. See generally Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re Lothian Oil Inc.), 650 F.3d 539,  
539–46 (5th Cir. 2011) (combining state and federal law to explain the parties’ rights in 
bankruptcy proceedings). 
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federal Bankruptcy Code, including the term “right to payment.”5 
For the court to define whether someone had a “right to payment,” 
the court had to define “claim.”6 Given that state law, and not the 
federal Bankruptcy Code, defines “claim,” the Ninth Circuit 
rightfully held that state law should be used to define “claim” in 
crafting the test.7 
This Comment will explore the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in In 
re Fitness Holdings that recognized the authority of bankruptcy 
courts to recharacterize debt as equity, and how the Ninth Circuit 
grounded that authority in state law.8 Part II provides a statement of 
the case. Part III describes the reasoning of the court and how it 
ultimately relied on state law to decide whether a court should 
recharacterize a particular purported debt as equity. Part IV compares 
recharacterization with a similar yet distinct concept: equitable 
subordination. Part V explores the differences between the majority 
and minority approach to recharacterization of debt as equity and 
ultimately demonstrates why the minority approach is more 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, while also detailing the 
ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s holding. Part VI concludes that 
the minority approach’s reliance on state law in determining whether 
a claim should be recharacterized from debt as equity makes more 
sense. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Fitness Holdings International (“Debtor”), a home fitness 
corporation, received significant capital and investments from two 
funding entities: Hancock Park (“Hancock”), Debtor’s sole 
shareholder, and Pacific Western Bank (“Pacific Western”).9 
From 2003 to 2006, Debtor received funding from Hancock in 
the form of an unsecured loan totaling approximately $24 million.10 
In 2004, Pacific Western made an additional secured loan in the 
amount of $12 million, secured by Debtor’s assets and guaranteed by 
Hancock.11 In 2007, Debtor refinanced its debt with a $17 million 
 
 5. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1145–47. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 1145–48. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 1143. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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term loan and an $8 million line of credit from Pacific Western, 
again secured by its assets.12 The loan agreement required Debtor to 
use $9 million dollars of loan proceeds to pay off Pacific Western’s 
existing secured loan and $12 million dollars to pay off the 
Hancock’s unsecured loan.13 The agreement also released Hancock 
from its guaranty to pay Pacific Western.14 
Then, one year later in 2008, Debtor filed a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central 
District of California.15 A committee of unsecured creditors filed a 
complaint against Hancock, Pacific Western, and two members of 
the Debtor’s board of directors on behalf of Fitness Holdings and its 
estate.16 The complaint sought “to recover the payments made to 
Hancock Park as a result of the refinancing transaction with Pacific 
Western Bank.”17 In addition, “[t]he complaint also requested 
declaratory relief, asking the court to characterize the financing 
Hancock provided to Fitness Holdings in connection with the 
promissory notes as equity investments in Fitness Holdings, rather 
than extensions of credit.”18 
Therefore, “the Committee argued, the transfer of funds to the 
shareholder as part of the refinancing constituted a constructively 
fraudulent transfer because such funds were a return of equity and 
not a repayment of debt.”19 The bankruptcy court dismissed the 
complaint on the merits and converted the case to Chapter 7.20 A 
Chapter 7 trustee replaced the creditors’ committee and appealed the 
court’s dismissal of the claim.21 “The district court affirmed, holding 
that it was bound to follow the decision of the Ninth Circuit 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in In re Pacific Express, Inc., and 
accordingly, the Chapter 7 trustee was barred from bringing a 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Michael L. Cook, Ninth Circuit Allows Bankruptcy Courts to Recharacterize Loans As 
Equity, Applying State Law, 130 BANKING L.J. 634, 635 (2013). 
 15. Id. 
 16. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1144. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, Ninth Circuit Holds That Debt Can Be Recharacterized 
as Equity, NAT’L L. REV. (June 5, 2013), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ninth-circuit 
-holds-debt-can-be-recharacterized-equity.  
 20. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1144. 
 21. Id. 
CAUTION AHEAD, INSIDER LENDERS 11/8/2014  2:01 PM 
1000 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:997 
recharacterization action.”22 
The trustee appealed, claiming that the “district court should 
have: (1) recharacterized Hancock’s payment of $11,995,500 to 
Fitness Holdings as a payment in satisfaction of an equity interest 
rather than a debt, and then (2) avoided Fitness Holdings’ 
$11,995,500 as a constructively fraudulent transfer under 
§ 548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code.”23 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT  
 
The trustee alleged in its complaint that the transfer from debtor 
to shareholder should be avoided as a fraudulent transfer because the 
transfer was not a repayment of debt, but instead a satisfaction of an 
equity interest.24 In order to rule on whether the transfer was 
fraudulent, the court had to decide two issues.25 First, does the court 
have the authority to recharacterize the purported loan as an equity 
investment for purposes of Bankruptcy Code § 548?26 Second, if the 
court does have this authority, then the court must decide whether 
state or federal law should be used to determine if the transfer is debt 
or equity.27 
First, the court had to determine if the purported transfer was 
fraudulent.28 Under Code §§ 548 and 550, a transfer is constructively 
fraudulent, and thus can be avoided by the trustee, if the debtor 
“received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for 
such transfer or obligation,”29 and if one of the four conditions listed 
in § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii) is satisfied.30 The Code does not define 
 
 22. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, supra note 19 (citation omitted). 
 23. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1144. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Thomson Reuters, In re Fitness Holdings: Ninth Circuit Reverses Precedent, 
Holding State Law Applies to Debt Recharacterization Analysis, PRAC. LAW (May 13, 2013), 
http://us.practicallaw.com/6-528-4745. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1145.  
 29. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012); see In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1145. 
 30. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii). The four conditions require that the debtor  
(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was 
incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation; (II) was 
engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or a 
transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably 
small capital; (III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that 
would be beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as such debts matured; or (IV) made such 
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“reasonable equivalent value,” but it does define “value”31 as “[the] 
satisfaction or securing of present or antecedent debt of debtor.”32 
Consequently, if the transfer from the debtor is in satisfaction of 
present or antecedent debt, then it cannot be avoided as 
constructively fraudulent because the purported transfer would be of 
“reasonably equivalent value.”33 
Next, the court had to decide whether the transfer was made in 
satisfaction of a debt.34 It did this by defining the word “debt.”35 The 
Bankruptcy Code defines debt as liability on a “claim,” which is the 
“right to payment.”36 The Code does not define “right to payment,” 
which allows the court to interpret the term.37 Specifically, the court 
had to decide if the right to payment was based in state or federal 
law.38 
Relying on well-established Supreme Court precedent in 
Butner v. United States39 and later reiterated in Travelers Casualty & 
Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,40 the court 
deferred to state law to define “right to payment.”41 The court relied 
on deep-rooted Supreme Court precedent, which “establishe[d] that, 
unless Congress has spoken, the nature and scope of a right to 
 
transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or incurred such obligation to or for the 
benefit of an insider, under an employment contract and not in the ordinary course of 
business.  
Id. 
 31. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1145.  
 32. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A). Under this definition, “[p]ayment of a preexisting debt is 
value, and if the payment is dollar-for-dollar, full value is given.” 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 
¶ 548.03[5] (16th ed. 2012). 
 33. See In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1145–46. 
 34. See id. at 1146. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. at 1145–47. 
 38. See id. at 1146. 
 39. 440 U.S. 48 (1979). The Supreme Court set out to resolve a circuit split by framing a 
very narrow question: whether state law or federal common law governed the subsidiary question 
of “whether a security interest in property extends to rents and profits derived from the property.” 
Id. at 52. A minority of circuits had adopted a “federal rule of equity that affords the mortgagee a 
secured interest in the rents even if state law would not recognize any such interest until after 
foreclosure.” Id. at 53. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the majority approach that the 
law of the state in which the property is located should resolve the matter. Id. at 54. Basically, the 
Butner Court reasoned that Congress was given constitutional authority to establish bankruptcy 
law; if Congress elected not to exercise its authority by legislating a “mortgagee’s interest in the 
rents and profits earned by property in a bankrupt estate,” it thereby left that power to state law. 
Id. 
 40. 549 U.S. 443 (2007). 
 41. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1146. 
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payment is determined by state law.”42 As Travelers stated (in 
reliance on Butner), “this means that when the Bankruptcy Code uses 
the word ‘claim’—which the code itself defines as a ‘right to 
payment’—it is usually referring to a right to payment recognized 
under state law.”43 Therefore, the court must decide if such an 
interest in the company’s assets is a “right to payment,” while still 
considering any applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.44 
Thus, because the trustee wanted to avoid an action as constructively 
fraudulent and Hancock argued that the transfer “constituted the 
repayment of a debt (and thus was a transfer for ‘reasonably 
equivalent value’),”45 the court had to re-examine § 548(a)(1)(B) in 
light of state law.46 Specifically the court had to consider, “whether 
the purported ‘debt’ constituted a right to payment under state 
law.”47 The court held that if the purported debt did not create a right 
to payment under state law, then the debtor’s obligation to the 
transferee could be recharacterized under state law principles.48 
Consequently, “a court considering a motion to avoid a transfer as 
constructively fraudulent under § 548(a)(1)(B) must determine 
whether the transfer is for the repayment of a ‘claim’ at all.”49  
Instead of ruling on the recharacterization issue, the court 
vacated the district court’s dismissal of the trustee’s constructively 
fraudulent claim and remanded the case back to the bankruptcy court 
with the new framework it had just established.50 
The court expressly rejected the district court’s reliance on the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (BAP) holding in Unsecured 
Creditors’ Committees of Pacific Express, Inc., and Pacific Express 
Holding, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. (In re Pacific 
Express, Inc.)51 that the Code “did not authorize courts to 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (citing Travelers, 549 U.S. at 451). 
 44. Id. at 1147. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Jordan A. Kroop & K. Derek Judd, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reverses 
Precedent—Courts Can Recharacterize Debt as Equity to the Extent Allowed Under State Law, 
SQUIRE SANDERS (May 2013), http://www.squiresanders.com/ninth-circuit-court-of-appeals 
-reverses-precedent-courts-can-recharacterize-debt-as-equity-to-the-extent-allowed-under-state-
law/. 
 51. 69 B.R. 112 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986). The BAP vacated the bankruptcy court’s finding that 
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characterize claims as equity or debt” but instead “limited courts to 
statutory remedy of equitable subordination under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 510.”52 Instead, the court joined five other circuits and held that 
courts have the power to recharacterize an obligation that, 
functionally, more closely resembles equity rather than debt under 
state law.53 
IV.  A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: COMPARING EQUITABLE 
SUBORDINATION TO RECHARACTERIZATION 
Since 1986 when the BAP decided In re Pacific Express, Inc.,54 
the Ninth Circuit has consistently held that it did not have the 
authority to recharacterize loans as debt, and instead courts were 
limited in their equitable power to subordinate claims under 
§ 510(c).55 However, recharacterization can be functionally similar to 
the concept of equitable subordination under § 510(c)(1) because 
both allow the court to take something that is purported debt and, in 
essence, “subordinate” the purported debt to all other general 
unsecured claims.56 Although these principles may be confused, they 
are vastly different in concept. In subordination, the court is 
subordinating debt as the lowest priority to be paid after other debt.57 
In recharacterization, the court is redefining or renaming some 
purported debt as equity; thus, the court recharacterizes the transfer 
from debt to equity rather than subordinating it from general 
unsecured debt to lowest priority debt.58 The two concepts result in 
different outcomes only if there is enough money in the estate to 
fully pay off general secured debts with money left over for the 
 
a purported loan was in fact an equity investment. Id. at 115. The BAP reasoned that, although 
the bankruptcy court has broad equitable powers, those powers do not permit it to apply a 
standard inconsistent with a specific, applicable provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. The court 
held that “the Code supports the court’s ability to determine the amount and the allowance or 
disallowance of claims” but those same provisions “do not provide for the characterization of 
claims as equity or debt.” Id. The court held that the district court’s recharacterization amounted 
to “subordination,” which is governed by § 510. Id. 
 52. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1147–48; see Cook, supra note 14, at 636. 
 53. In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1148. 
 54. See supra note 51. 
 55. See In re Fitness, 714 F.3d at 1144–48. 
 56. See Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 
454–55 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 57. JOAN N. FEENEY, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 6:75 (5th ed. 2014). 
 58. In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d at 454–56. 
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subordinate debt.59 
There are many different types of subordination, but the most 
relevant in this context is equitable subordination.60 Under 
§ 501(c)(1), the court may “under principles of equitable 
subordination, subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of 
an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim or all or part 
of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest.”61 
This subordination is based on fairness; even if the claim is correctly 
defined as debt, the court may choose to subordinate the claim if the 
creditor acts in an inequitable way.62 “In an equitable subordination 
action, the analysis focuses on the behavior of a creditor, knocking 
down the status of a claim where a creditor engages in inequitable 
conduct.”63  
In contrast, in recharacterization, the court focuses on the 
substance of the claim when deciding if the alleged debtor and 
creditor mislabeled the purported debt as equity within the confines 
of the Code.64 “In other words, recharacterization is a definitional 
attack.”65 If a purported debt is recharacterized as equity, then there 
is no need for a subordination analysis: under equitable 
subordination, the claim is presumed to be a “claim” within the 
confines of the Code.66 
Another notable difference is how the court treats the party’s 
formal rights in either action.67 “[W]hen a claim is equitably 
subordinated, a court disregards a party’s formal rights,” but “when a 
claim is recharacterized, a court determines what those formal rights 
are in the first instance.”68 The court does this by focusing on 
definitions within the Code and, depending on which circuit the 
claim is filed in, using either an equitable federal test (in the majority 
circuits) or interpreting applicable state law (in the minority 
 
 59. See FEENEY, supra note 57, § 6:75. 
 60. See id. 
 61. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2012). 
 62. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc. (In re Airadigm Commc’ns, 
Inc.), 616 F.3d 642, 658 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. In the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, courts also use state law to determine whether the 
purported debt was mislabeled as equity. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. 
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circuits).69 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit joined five other circuits in holding that 
bankruptcy courts have the authority to recharacterize claims.70 
However, circuits are split over what a court should look to or what 
law to apply in determining whether a claim can be recharacterized.71 
Circuits in the majority created different federal equitable tests in 
contrast to the minority’s uniform reliance on respective state law to 
decide the issue of recharacterization.72 Between the majority and 
minority approaches, the Ninth Circuit correctly aligned with the 
minority because it followed Supreme Court precedent, specifically 
Butner, in the absence of an applicable code provision.73 However, 
there are unique ramifications to the minority’s decision to 
recharacterize debt as equity. For all of the circuits, 
recharacterization will affect the distribution of the assets for the 
recharacterized interest.74 Specific to the minority approach, lawyers 
must be conscious of choice-of-law clauses in loan agreements and 
the potential for increased scrutiny of insider loans by the bankruptcy 
courts within the Ninth Circuit.75 
A.  Majority Circuits’ Approach:  
Equitable Tests 
The Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits created and applied 
various federal law tests to analyze whether to recharacterize a 
purported loan as equity.76 Although the multi-factored tests vary, 
the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits all relied on “authority 
vested in the bankruptcy courts to use their equitable powers to test 
 
 69. See Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 2, at 1261. 
 70. See Cook, supra note 14, at 636–37. 
 71. See id. at 637. 
 72. See Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 2, at 1261. 
 73. Compare Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, of the Estate of Fitness Holdings Int’l, 
Inc. v. Hancock Park Capital II, L.P. (In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc.), 714 F.3d 1141, 1146–47 
(9th Cir. 2013) (“We now construe § 548(a)(1)(B) in light of the Butner principle.”), with 
Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re Lothian Oil Inc.), 650 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The 
Supreme Court has held that the ‘applicable law’ is state law . . . .” (citing Butner v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)). 
 74. See Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 2. 
 75. Thomson Reuters, supra note 25. 
 76. Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 2, at 1261. 
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the validity of debts.”77 These general equitable powers are defined 
in § 105, “which states that bankruptcy judges have the authority to 
‘issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate 
to carry out the provisions’ of the Code.”78 
These circuits modeled their multi-factored tests after “factors 
derived from U.S. tax decisions related to the tax benefits of insider 
loans.”79 The most commonly cited multi-factor test is the Sixth 
Circuit’s eleven-factor test in the tax case of Roth Steel Tube Co. v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.80 In Roth, the Court weighed the 
following factors: 
(1) [T]he names given to the instruments, if any, evidencing 
the indebtedness; (2) the presence or absence of a fixed 
maturity date and schedule of payments; (3) the presence or 
absence of a fixed rate of interest and interest payments; (4) 
the source of repayments; (5) the adequacy or inadequacy 
of capitalization; (6) the identity of interest between the 
creditor and the stockholder; (7) the security, if any, for the 
advances; (8) the corporation’s ability to obtain financing 
from outside lending institutions; (9) the extent to which the 
advances were subordinated to the claims of outside 
creditors; (10) the extent to which the advances were used 
to acquire capital assets; and (11) the presence or absence of 
a sinking fund to provide repayments.81 
The Sixth Circuit adopted Roth’s eleven-factor test, which was 
then adopted by Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In re AutoStyle 
Plastics, Inc.).82 Since then, circuits have employed seven-factor, 
eleven-factor, and thirteen-factor tests.83 Though the majority circuits 
have not decided on one single test, each court emphasized how its 
respective test was to be applied on a case-by-case basis, focusing on 
the specific facts of each case.84 Additionally, although each circuit 
has included or excluded different factors over others, there is one 
 
 77. Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726, 748 (6th 
Cir. 2001). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 2. 
 80. 800 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 81. Id. 
 82. 269 F.3d at 750. 
 83. Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 2, at 1262 n.15. 
 84. In re Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 
455–56 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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“overarching inquiry” to each test.85 The common inquiry is 
“whether the parties called an instrument one thing when in fact they 
intended it as something else.”86 
To summarize, the majority courts all identified the same source 
of authority—U.S. tax decisions—to create these federal tests.87 
However, the courts within the majority all relied on this authority to 
create different multi-factor tests that derive from tax law.88 
B.  Minority View 
As explained above, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits are the 
minority view, finding their answer to the issue of recharacterization 
through applicable state law.89 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit 
interpreted the meaning of “right to payment,” starting with 
interpreting the Bankruptcy Code statutes to define “debt” and 
“value,” and defaulting to state law to define “right to payment.”90  
C.  Why the Minority View Is Correct 
The Ninth Circuit correctly approached this issue by deferring to 
applicable state law because state law is consistent with existing 
legal precedent within the bankruptcy court.91 In order to understand 
why the minority view is more consistent with bankruptcy precedent, 
it is important to understand the aforementioned key case within 
bankruptcy law, Butner.92 As described above, Butner focused on a 
very specific issue: “whether the right to such rents [collected during 
a period of bankruptcy/foreclosure] is determined by a federal rule of 
equity or by the law of State where the property is located.”93 At the 
time, there existed a circuit split between the majority group—the 
Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits—and the minority 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Thomson Reuters, supra note 25. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, of the Estate of Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc. v. 
Hancock Park Capital II, L.P. (In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc.), 714 F.3d 1141, 1142–47 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (“Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a 
bankrupt’s estate to state law[.]”) (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)). 
 90. Id. at 1145–47. 
 91. E.g., Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re Lothian Oil Inc.), 650 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 
2011) (citing the Supreme Court’s holding that the “applicable law” is state law). 
 92. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979). 
 93. Id. at 49. 
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group—the Third and Seventh Circuits.94 The majority group 
determined that applicable state law should answer this issue.95 The 
minority group “adopted a federal rule of equity that affords the 
mortgagee a secured interest in the rents even if state law would not 
recognize any such interest until after foreclosure.”96 
Butner vehemently rejected the minority approach for several 
reasons. First, Butner stated that the Constitution gives Congress the 
right to create this statute, and if it chooses not to exercise that right, 
then Congress has generally left this specific determination to state 
law.97 Next, Butner noted that “property interests are created and 
defined by state law,” and “[u]nless some federal interest requires a 
different result, there is no reason why such interests should be 
analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in 
a bankruptcy proceeding.”98 The court’s reliance on state law will 
“reduce uncertainty, discourage forum shopping and prevent a party 
from ‘receiving a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of 
bankruptcy.’”99 Lastly, Butner recognized the general equitable 
powers of the bankruptcy court but explained that these equitable 
powers are best used on a case-by-case basis, instead of creating a 
uniform federal rule based upon “undefined considerations of 
equity.”100 Butner encompasses the sentiment of bankruptcy law in 
general: “[i]n the absence of some specific bankruptcy interest or 
provision, bankruptcy courts will take non-bankruptcy rights as they 
are found.”101 
As evidenced by Butner, the minority circuits’ holdings are 
consistent with established bankruptcy principles. First, Congress has 
the constitutional power to enact a statute to address this very issue 
of recharacterization.102 However, it has not yet done so and thus, the 
natural step is to default to state law as Butner clearly explained.103 
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 99. Id. 
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Second, “right to payment” is defined by state law, and under Butner, 
“[u]nless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no 
reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply 
because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.”104 
A major theme of bankruptcy law is, when a court is faced with 
making a decision, it must take bankruptcy law and layer it over 
existing federal or state-law rights.105 Unless there is a federal statute 
that says otherwise, established legal precedent requires that the 
court defer to state law.106 As of now, there is no provision within the 
Code that discusses the topic of recharacterization.107 Therefore, the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach of defaulting to state law when faced with 
defining a “claim” stems naturally from legal precedent clearly 
established in Butner.108 
Lastly, Butner rejected the notion of a bankruptcy court creating 
a uniform equitable test without some specific power vested to it 
through a statute.109 Using this same reasoning, Butner would reject 
the majority courts’ differing equitable tests because, similar to the 
minority in Butner, the tests are founded on some undefined 
equitable power.110 
Perhaps the majority’s approach of creating a federal test would 
make more sense if the tests were consistent throughout the circuits, 
but instead, each circuit differentiates from one another.111 
Moreover, if a Code provision addressed recharacterization, then 
federal courts would naturally adopt a uniform test that would help 
determine when a claim should be recharacterized. Since this issue of 
recharacterization is unique to bankruptcy, a Code provision 
instigating a uniform federal test might be most efficient. However, 
because the majority circuits each have their own unique tests and 
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the Code does not contain a specific statute for recharacterization,112 
the Ninth Circuit approach is more logical. Without the presence of a 
federal statute to specifically govern the recharacterization, the Ninth 
Circuit followed bankruptcy precedent by relying on the Butner 
principle and defaulting to state law to determine applicable rights.113 
D.  Ramifications of Recharacterization  
Within the Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to recharacterize a purported debt 
as equity has three significant consequences: (1) the obvious change 
in the order of distribution, (2) closer scrutiny of insider trading, and 
(3) the increased importance of a choice of law clause in any loan 
agreement. 
First, if a court recharacterizes debt as equity, then the liquidated 
assets of the estate are distributed accordingly.114 “Recharacterization 
ensures that non-insider creditor claims will be paid first from the 
available assets of the corporation.”115 Consider the following 
example. Someone may have intended to make a loan and extended 
credit. However, the court decides that the transfer more closely 
resembles an equity interest rather than an extension of credit 
(despite the formal title) and decides to recharacterize the debt as 
equity. Consequently, in the case of bankruptcy, that person’s claim 
is subordinated significantly below other true creditors’ claims, and 
there is the risk that he may not receive any money if there is nothing 
left after the estate pays back the creditors. 
Second, the Ninth Circuit’s holding will most significantly 
impact insider loans and similar transactions because the courts now 
can review and recharacterize these specific types of transactions, 
despite what the alleged creditor and debtor formally titled the 
transaction.116 As a remedy, recharacterization is “most commonly 
invoked when an insider purports to loan money to a company when 
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it is undercapitalized and the cash infusion should have taken the 
form of a capital contribution.”117 Thus, claims involving allegations 
of insider loans have an available remedy within the Ninth Circuit: 
recharacterization.118 As a result of both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits 
requiring application of state law to determine whether an alleged 
insider loan should be recharacterized as equity, choice-of-law 
statements are now very important in drafting transactions or legal 
agreements.119 As a result, how state law evolves and how a court 
determines which state’s law governs the case will affect the level of 
scrutiny applied to cases on insider loans.120 
Lastly, because the Ninth and Fifth Circuits held that they had 
the power to recharacterize by looking to state law, choice-of-law 
provisions within loan contracts will be very helpful if there is 
potential for a recharacterization claim.121 This is because one state 
law may be more favorable or developed than another.122 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in In re Fitness Holdings is a 
“cautionary tale to corporate insiders (including private equity 
sponsors) that make loans to a company or attempt to cash out in a 
refinancing or dividend recapitalization transaction shortly before the 
company files for bankruptcy.”123 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ state-law approach 
to recharacterization is superior to the majority circuits’ approach of 
employing various self-created equitable tests because it adheres 
more strictly to Supreme Court precedent, best established in Butner. 
However, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on state law poses potential 
problems that attorneys should carefully draft around and take into 
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account when advising their clients.124 Specifically, attorneys should 
pay close attention to choice-of-law clauses in loan agreements, 
depending on which state law the client finds preferable. Also, 
attorneys should advise clients knowing that courts will look at 
insider loans with closer scrutiny now that courts have the authority 
to recharacterize the purported debt into equity. Ultimately, the 
newly recognized remedy of recharacterization in the Ninth Circuit 
will make lenders think twice before signing any loan agreement. 
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